The International Sources of Domestic Politics
A recent article in the NYT (listed infra) describes China's new, more open expression of its desire to become a world power. The article captures China's "shifting official line" as it begins to claim its place as the representative of one fifth of the world's population. I agree with the overall conclusion but offer a slightly different interpretation on the recent CCTV mini-series "Great Powers" on which the author bases his story.
The NYT article describes the series as written by an elite group of Chinese party intellectuals. Although the author notes that it is "not a jingoistic call to arms," "mentions China only in passing," and offers a version of history that "differs markedly from that of the textbooks still in use in many schools" nevertheless, he suggests that "[t]he documentary also emphasizes historical themes that coincide with policies Chinese leaders promote at home. Social stability, industrial investment, peaceful foreign relations and national unity are presented as more vital than, say, military strength, political liberalization or the rule of law." The series, however, struck me as a much stronger call for political reform.
First, the series was incredible in how openly it discussed Western political systems and in which systems it chose to praise. I was only able to watch the final episode, but I was struck by how the series highlighted Holland, the U.K. and the U.S. as the only powers that were able to develop truly international economic might. I was also amazed when it went on to suggest that only the U.S. and U.K. were truly able to sustain that status, citing their political systems as the reason why they could protect their economic creativity and adaptability. The key attributes directly mentioned by academics interviewed: parliamentary governance and two party politics. Although the episode summarized a number of other lessons from the series — like the need for later developing countries to have stronger government involvement in leading economic development — could such an open emphasis on Anglo-American constitutional democracy be anything less than at least a strong hint that the series is suggesting China’s political structure needs to change?
At a broader level, I can understand how most observers would miss the political implications of the series. The message is subtle. A counter-factual anaylsis might be helpful in appreciating how the CCTV series is as much about domestic politics as it is about China’s international position. Let us imagine for a minute what a series on great powers could have discussed——diplomacy and international relations, war and military might, colonialism and economic conquest, trade and globalization. Instead, the series focused on the domestic rise of the great powers. Lincoln and the Civil War, FDR and the New Deal, the UK and parliamentary governance, the world’s first stock market in the Netherlands, etc. This choice to frame the great powers’ rise in terms of their domestic system is what makes this series the provocative and powerful call for reform that it is.
Linking domestic change with international demands is not a new tactic in Chinese politics. Reformers in the Qing Dynasty used China’s military losses to colonial powers as political cover to call for structural changes. More recently, it was exemplified in Deng Xiaoping’s Reform and Opening program, which based China’s economic reforms on the need to adapt China to the world economy. A very timely example was China’s admission into the WTO, which provided the international political cover for politically difficult domestic reforms.
The root of this international-domestic link lies in the closed nature of Chinese political culture. Because of “face,” superiors are not open to criticism and juniors rarely risk offering suggestions. Moreover, when one’s interests are inextricably tied to the present system, there is great fear of change. The present may not be perfect, but one needs real political cover to suggest it should be changed. International pressures can provide that cover, especially if the pressure is framed as a universal natural law that all countries have to meet equally. The best example is economics, which China now views as relatively objective and unavoidably universal. Hence, framing something in economic terms offers face-saving cover for tough criticism and tough changes. The CCTV Great Power series seeks to do the same thing with politics. By framing the rise of great powers in terms of a universal process—political science we might call it— the Party historians who developed the series give themselves and other political reformers the political cover necessary to offer tough criticisms and push through tough political changes at home.
China's desire to become a great power is real, and the CCTV series is part of that general trend. But by framing the rise of great powers through the lens of domestic political systems, the elite historians who developed the series have actually issued a strong call for domestic structural (read––political) reform. It's subtle, but it's there. Moreover, they have offered a clear vision for what a successful great power must do —— establish parliamentary governance and two party politics, among other reforms. The fact that it ended up on national television clearly signals to me that some parts of the leadership are seriously interested.
For the original NYT article, see "China, Shy Giant, Shows Signs of Shedding its False Modesty" by Joseph Kahn, The New York Times, December 11, 2006.
The NYT article describes the series as written by an elite group of Chinese party intellectuals. Although the author notes that it is "not a jingoistic call to arms," "mentions China only in passing," and offers a version of history that "differs markedly from that of the textbooks still in use in many schools" nevertheless, he suggests that "[t]he documentary also emphasizes historical themes that coincide with policies Chinese leaders promote at home. Social stability, industrial investment, peaceful foreign relations and national unity are presented as more vital than, say, military strength, political liberalization or the rule of law." The series, however, struck me as a much stronger call for political reform.
First, the series was incredible in how openly it discussed Western political systems and in which systems it chose to praise. I was only able to watch the final episode, but I was struck by how the series highlighted Holland, the U.K. and the U.S. as the only powers that were able to develop truly international economic might. I was also amazed when it went on to suggest that only the U.S. and U.K. were truly able to sustain that status, citing their political systems as the reason why they could protect their economic creativity and adaptability. The key attributes directly mentioned by academics interviewed: parliamentary governance and two party politics. Although the episode summarized a number of other lessons from the series — like the need for later developing countries to have stronger government involvement in leading economic development — could such an open emphasis on Anglo-American constitutional democracy be anything less than at least a strong hint that the series is suggesting China’s political structure needs to change?
At a broader level, I can understand how most observers would miss the political implications of the series. The message is subtle. A counter-factual anaylsis might be helpful in appreciating how the CCTV series is as much about domestic politics as it is about China’s international position. Let us imagine for a minute what a series on great powers could have discussed——diplomacy and international relations, war and military might, colonialism and economic conquest, trade and globalization. Instead, the series focused on the domestic rise of the great powers. Lincoln and the Civil War, FDR and the New Deal, the UK and parliamentary governance, the world’s first stock market in the Netherlands, etc. This choice to frame the great powers’ rise in terms of their domestic system is what makes this series the provocative and powerful call for reform that it is.
Linking domestic change with international demands is not a new tactic in Chinese politics. Reformers in the Qing Dynasty used China’s military losses to colonial powers as political cover to call for structural changes. More recently, it was exemplified in Deng Xiaoping’s Reform and Opening program, which based China’s economic reforms on the need to adapt China to the world economy. A very timely example was China’s admission into the WTO, which provided the international political cover for politically difficult domestic reforms.
The root of this international-domestic link lies in the closed nature of Chinese political culture. Because of “face,” superiors are not open to criticism and juniors rarely risk offering suggestions. Moreover, when one’s interests are inextricably tied to the present system, there is great fear of change. The present may not be perfect, but one needs real political cover to suggest it should be changed. International pressures can provide that cover, especially if the pressure is framed as a universal natural law that all countries have to meet equally. The best example is economics, which China now views as relatively objective and unavoidably universal. Hence, framing something in economic terms offers face-saving cover for tough criticism and tough changes. The CCTV Great Power series seeks to do the same thing with politics. By framing the rise of great powers in terms of a universal process—political science we might call it— the Party historians who developed the series give themselves and other political reformers the political cover necessary to offer tough criticisms and push through tough political changes at home.
China's desire to become a great power is real, and the CCTV series is part of that general trend. But by framing the rise of great powers through the lens of domestic political systems, the elite historians who developed the series have actually issued a strong call for domestic structural (read––political) reform. It's subtle, but it's there. Moreover, they have offered a clear vision for what a successful great power must do —— establish parliamentary governance and two party politics, among other reforms. The fact that it ended up on national television clearly signals to me that some parts of the leadership are seriously interested.
For the original NYT article, see "China, Shy Giant, Shows Signs of Shedding its False Modesty" by Joseph Kahn, The New York Times, December 11, 2006.
posted by Andy Green at
11:15 PM
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